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This article examines the complex risks, costs and rewards of large-scale private law 
climate litigation – the climate litigation ‘holy grail’. It argues that while these cases 
undoubtedly have heroic aspects, their impacts can be complex or difficult to 
understand.  It uses overlapping theories of metaphor and narrative in law, and theories 
of private law, to make some critical observations about these cases. Distilling some 
core reflections from the grail legends, the article argues that success in these cases 
requires a nuanced understanding of victory and defeat, and more careful thinking about 
the character, aims and effect of these pieces of litigation. These stories inspire constant 
reflection as to what the metaphor of the ‘holy grail’ might mean in this context, and the 
role these cases play in the development of a narrative about climate litigation.   
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1. INTRODUCTION: THE BURIAL OF THE DEAD 
 
 2 
Students of the Grail literature cannot fail to have been impressed by a certain 
atmosphere or awe of mystery which surrounds that enigmatic Vessel. There is a secret 
connected with it, the revelation of which will entail dire misfortune on the betrayer.  If 
spoken of at all it must be with scrupulous accuracy. 1 
 
This article discusses the risks, rewards, contribution and significance of large-scale 
private law cases seeking relief from governments or major emitters in relation to 
climate harms.  Drawing on literature that reflects on the use of stories and metaphor in 
the legal imagination,2  I use the highly evocative grail legends to reinterpret a small 
selection of high-profile climate cases, exploring more deeply their character and 
implications. My purpose is to challenge the conception of the ‘holy grail’ as a zenith of 
achievement, part of a quest to ‘solve’ the problems of climate change in one heroic 
action. I seek to disrupt this metaphorical framing, and draw on the grail legends to 
suggest that a grail quest can also be a story of hubris and missed opportunities, a 
jostling to be part of a story of valour.  The complexity of these cases and the narrative 
around them, makes them difficult to understand and their implications hard to interpret.  
For this reason, examining the contested grail legends can support an alternative 
understanding of their problematic nature.  
 


















It is very useful to commence this enquiry by thinking about the ‘holy grail’ kinds of 
cases.  I discuss a few of these, exploring their costs and possible implications for 
climate governance, highlighting core cautionary reflections that emerge from reading 
these cases through the grail stories. I have two main reasons for my case selection.  
Firstly, as these cases are well-known, they are a useful vehicle through which to 
explore the complex role that private law can play in climate litigation. So, while this 
article is predominantly ‘about’ these high-profile cases, it can support reflection about 
the impacts of climate litigation in private law more generally.  Secondly, the well-
known nature of these cases makes them part of our narrative about the ‘fight’ against 
climate change, so it is useful to examine their contribution to that narrative.  
 
The article is structured as follows.  The next section (2) is in three parts.  Firstly, I 
briefly discuss the legends of the holy grail, exploring some of the complex themes 
inherent in these stories.  Secondly, I make some comments about the importance of 
climate litigation, explaining why I call this category of cases the ‘holy grail’ cases.  
Thirdly, I discuss private law theory and theories of narrative and metaphor in legal 
thinking, explaining how this helps me to make the arguments I wish to make in this 
article.  In the next two sections, I discuss a small selection of holy grail cases.  I 
explain that it is useful to analyze these in terms of their broader instrumental role, 
using them as examples to support my wider arguments.  The purpose of this article is 
not to look in depth at the prospects or doctrine of the cases; there is a lot of excellent 
scholarship cited herein that does this. The purpose of this article is to take a critical and 
creative look at the meaning of these cases, questioning how they might contribute to a 
climate response.  I do not need to take a chronological ‘generational’ approach,3 but I 




approach these cases in relation to the dimension of climate chance response they 
would or could impact.4 So I look at: mitigation, for which I discuss Urgenda (section 
3); next I look at the complex interface between adaptation and loss and damage, 
discussing Comer v. Murphy, then make some comments about the new ‘carbon 
majors’ cases (section 4). Finally I conclude (section 5). The sections’ titles are 
borrowed from TS Eliot’s long poem The Waste Land, which is heavily influenced by 
grail myths and legends.5  
 
2. A GAME OF CHESS: THE METAPHOR OF THE HOLY GRAIL IN 
CLIMATE LITIGATION 
 
He enters the hall and sees a game of chess. ‘The two sides were playing against 
each other by themselves; the side he helped lost, and the other side’s pieces 
shouted, absolutely as if they were real men.’ 6 
 
2.1 Core Lessons from the Legend of the Holy Grail 
The ancient legend of the quest for the Holy Grail, features a (usually) lone wandering 
knight undertaking a treacherous journey, ostensibly to find and return the missing 
grail.  He (sometimes they) sets out from home naïve and untested, and becomes 
engaged in the all-consuming pursuit of the grail.  He is challenged by a variety of 
quests and problems, sometimes returning ‘victorious’, and sometimes not.  Far from 
being swashbucklers, these stories are complex, nuanced and deeply symbolic. 







Certainly, they are apocryphal, and the true origins and meaning of both the grail 
legends and the grail itself, are highly contested.7   
 
The proliferation of stories through different eras, and political events, 8 accounts for the 
lack of a single, coherent grail story.9  However, there is sufficient coherence and 
consistency to extract core themes and underlying meaning from the tales.10 A ‘core’ 
story, extracted by Wood, is as follows: 
 
A mysterious vessel or object which sustains life and/or provides sustenance is guarded 
in a castle which is difficult to find. The owner of the castle is either lame or sick and 
often (but not always) the surrounding land is barren. The owner can only be restored if a 
knight finds the castle and, after seeing a mysterious procession, asks a certain question. 
If he fails, as the knight does, everything will remain as before and the search must begin 
again.  After wanderings and adventures (many of which relate to events which the young 
hero failed to understand the first time), the knight returns and asks the question which 
cures the king and restores the land. The hero knight succeeds the wounded king (usually 
called the Fisher King) as guardian of the castle and its contents.11 
 
Further details appear in some (but not all) of the stories.  As the knight engages in the 
quest, he faces a number of tasks or challenges, and is beset with confusion.12  In many 
of the earlier quests he either fails entirely, only partially succeeds, or dies.  His lack of 
success is attributable to his failure properly to understand ‘the precise character of the 











task’ before him, 13 and to ask the right questions at the right time. The knight usually 
does not comprehend what he needs to do, or precisely what it is that he seeks.14  
Powerful themes emerge: of high-stakes risk and reward, purity, self-realization, blood 
vengeance.  For instance, the best known versions stem from the Arthurian romances in 
which Lancelot, Gawain, Gareth and Galahad ride from Camelot to find the grail, which 
in this version is the vessel from the Last Supper.15   Separated, the knights face 
different challenges, with themes of bravery, battles and the absolution of sin from 
themselves and others.  Only the purer of the knights can even see the Grail,16 with 
Galahad eventually finding and taking it, becoming King.17  
 
It is never entirely clear what the holy grail actually is. In later retellings of the grail 
stories, the holy grail is frequently a vessel of blood belonging to Joseph of 
Arimathea.18 However this is certainly a re-interpretation of earlier versions, where the 
grail might be a vessel,19 a stone,20 a burial cloth,21 or the achievement of an elevated 
state through a ritual initiation.22 For my purposes, the unseen and unknown nature of 
the grail is useful, as it forms part of an allegory of the pursuit of the unknown. What 
really matters is what the grail signifies in the stories: something indefinable and almost 
impossible to attain, which, if it is found, will solve all problems and right all wrongs.  
 
















An important theme in the romances is the poor health of the king (sometimes the 
Fisher King), and its inherent connection with the ecological devastation of the knight’s 
adopted homeland. The tales vary: sometimes wasting of the land precedes the knight’s 
endeavours,23 and sometimes this is associated with his failure on the quest. For 
instance, one of the oldest iterations features Perlesvaux, whose failure to ask the 
expected questions plunges the Fisher King into decline, and brings a curse upon the 
entire country, and the court of King Arthur as well.24  Percival too encounters a young 
girl who tells him: ‘… if he had asked the questions “What is the grail and who does it 
serve?” he would have healed the Fisher King and granted prosperity to his kingdom’.25  
In other versions the knight Gawain partially succeeds – through proper questioning he 
manages to bring about some ecological recovery, and heals the Fisher King, although 
he does not find the grail.26 In some, the knight Galahad does find the grail, but then it is 
lost, and he dies. Arthur dies thereafter.27 In other versions, the wasteland cannot be 
remedied by any quest and the sovereign cannot be healed.28  Although we know, 
certainly from Malory, that Arthur was not happy about the cost of his best knights,29 
most versions do not address the opportunity cost of the quest or the ‘cleaning up’ – 
both to the wasteland, and the hero’s damaged form - that needs to be done during and 
after.30  Of course, none of the protagonist knights have any insight into the version of 
the story in which they are.   
 














Having outlined the contentious and labyrinthine nature of these stories, it seems odd to 
assert that they may be instructive for anything, particularly for legal studies.  However 
their value as a metaphor for the ‘holy grail’ cases goes beyond the semantic – these 
stories are part of folklore, and this terminology does encourage us to reflect on the 
vagaries, arduousness and grand risks and rewards of such cases.31  Despite their 
complexity, it is possible to distil a few core lessons that are helpful to understand the 
cases I discuss.  
 
Firstly, victory and defeat are not always clearly defined or distinct.  For instance, in the 
legends, does victory mean being able to see the grail, drinking from it, taking the grail, 
restoring the wasteland, healing the King, survival, or blood vengeance?  Secondly, the 
knights get better at being on a grail quest when they achieve clarity in ‘the character of 
their quests’: they understand the nature of their endeavour and ask the right questions.  
At some point, they know to ask what the grail is - what it is they seek – whom it 
serves, and hence, how to get it.  This is a central concern in most of the stories; that 
any good fortune requires clarity in the quest.  Thirdly, these are tales about hubris and 
missed opportunities; in as much as things rarely end well for the sillier knights, while 
they are busy on their quest, their responsibilities at home (sometimes Camelot, 
sometimes their birth homes) are neglected, and no other action is taken to restore the 
wasteland.  A fourth, more abstract lesson, is about narrative and the possibilities for 
reflection.  As Little explains: ‘Through story, complex issues and truths are brought 
and carried along together in a way that has deep cultural resonance, and that is 
accessible and made significant…’.32  The point is that these stories are complex, 
contradictory, and their concepts of heroism and failure, bravery and hubris, neglect and 





obsession, risk and reward form part of our (Anglo-American) cultural narrative.  While 
I have distilled three core ‘lessons’ for the purposes of this article, the aim of using 
complex stories is to encourage ongoing reflection - about purpose and intent, victory 
and defeat, risk and reward - beyond the legal space.  
 
2.2. Importance of climate litigation and the ‘holy grail’ cases  
Before discussing the cases, I must explain the need for and relevance of litigation for 
global climate governance.  Climate change derails economic, ethical and 
epistemological certainties.  It challenges given behaviours and accepted ‘goods’ of 
society on a global level, and compels personal and structural self-examination on a 
level that is not only uncomfortable, but also potentially futile, unless coordinated with 
meaningful action.  Without an adequate response, climatic changes stand to alter many 
global weather patterns, reducing habitability for many species, including humans.33 
Inherent in the very terminology used to describe our core response – mitigation – is the 
appreciation that we are engaging in a process of damage control.34 This global issue 
demands a comprehensive response from states to co-ordinate extensive reductions in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, a chief driver for climate change. 
 
The beginning of 2016 saw the adoption of the Paris Agreement,35  which amongst its 
many achievements included consensus on the need to restrict warming ‘to well below 
2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 












1.5°C above pre-industrial levels’,36 and to do so at pace.37  The need for this stringency 
on temperature limits had been on the table for some time,38 but member states in Paris 
also commissioned a special report from the United Nations’ (UN’s) own scientific 
advisory body, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to discuss the 
impacts of more than 1.5°C of warming.39  The 2018 Special Report of the IPCC 
confirmed that restricting warming to 1.5°C – compared to 2°C – would be associated 
with safer levels of warming and significantly reduced risks, but also require far-
reaching changes, which are probably more difficult than anticipated.40  The design of 
the Paris Agreement requires parties to make pledges, or nationally determined 
contributions (NDCs) which specify the actions to be taken at national and subnational 
level to contribute to this collective goal; however, it was plain from the outset that the 
pledged reductions were not sufficient to stay even within 2°C limits.41 
 
The intervening years have seen some challenges: a series of vocal disavowals of 
commitment from a significant emitter,42 fraught and difficult negotiations of the means 
of implementation of the Paris Agreement, and difficulties achieving a consensus-based 
adoption of the abovementioned report and, with it, commitment to a 1.5°C limit.43  
Most significant for the article, is the continuing shortfall in mitigation ambition 

















required to keep warming within those ‘safe’ limits.44  This was recognized at the 2018 
conference of the parties (COP) in Katowice (Poland), the decisions of which stressed 
‘the urgency of enhanced ambition’ in light of the growing recognition that the pledged 
emissions reductions will not be sufficient to reach the collective goal.45 A global 
agreement on emissions reduction was always simply the starting point of a coherent 
and appropriate response, but these and other factors re-emphasize the need for other 
forms of governance, including effective, strategic litigation, to support climate 
response.  
 
Until recently, significant high-profile successes in climate litigation arose from public 
law challenges. This makes sense, as public litigation has more immediate potential to 
strong-arm regulators into action, responding to the ‘institutional failure’ which 
frequently drives climate litigation.46  Of course, activity in the courts is not limited to 
headline cases; climate litigation is escalating globally and includes a range of subtle 
and strategic actions brought across scales of governance. 47 For instance, in several 
jurisdictions administrative law challenges from both ‘sides’ have unarguably shaped 
domestic regulation relating to the production and consumption of energy.48  Despite 
this, there is very little radical climate litigation. Most is ‘business as usual’,49 raising 



















few novel points and upsetting few apple-carts.  Arguably, this is indicative of climate 
litigation’s integration in mainstream practices, meaning that climate change is treated 
as a radical issue, but forms part of the more routine practices of disaggregated 
governance that typify our response to climate change.50  More mundane actions – for 
instance low-value claims in the domestic courts - remain fairly underutilized; although 
these are likely to increase as parties litigate localized climate damage, if adaptation 
attempts fail to keep pace with changes.  The nature of ‘inadvertent’ climate litigation – 
for instance, where a litigated dispute affects climate policy but is not brought for that 
purpose - also remains underexplored. 51   Of course, it is not intuitively clear why low-
value or obscure actions matter, and this is not the place for a full discussion.  It is 
arguable however that the significance of these cases lies in their very ordinariness, 
making them easy to overlook even as they support or frustrate climate policy.52   
 
I now turn to private law, which is usually seen to regulate rights and obligations 
between private parties. Private law disputes demand a focused analysis of 
foreseeability, reasonable standards of care, and acceptable social conduct. Far from 
being an unsuited to tackle broader social issues, private law cases foster deeply 
normative enquiries that shape our understanding of socially acceptable conduct, 
including what this might mean in a climate context.  Nevertheless, private law 
scholarship and practice in climate litigation remain oddly skewed, with considerable 
attention to actions for climate harms against large-scale emitters, 53 and its potential 












virtually ignored elsewhere.54  The former are the kinds of cases first considered when 
scholars turned their attention to the topic of climate litigation,55 and they form roughly 
the category of cases to which I refer as the ‘holy grail’ of climate litigation.  This term 
emerges in the literature in what was probably the first significant edited collection on 
climate litigation, where it is observed that a private action for damages is ‘…seen as a 
kind of Holy Grail by environmental campaigners and as an unacceptable disaster 
scenario by sectors of industry which might have to bear the cost. The numbers of 
potential claimants and defendants in this type of action, and the scale of potential 
compensation, are all huge, and indeed the very wide scope of such claims is one policy 
factor against their being permitted’.56  Kysar also uses this metaphor, although more 
specifically, in relation to injunctive relief arising from the kind of actions I discuss.57   
This descriptor appears sporadically throughout the academic literature, 58 where it 
consistently refers to mass private law litigation for climate harms.  Significantly, it is 
also used by activists and practitioners, with very much the same meaning.59  
 


























Prior to 2015, holy grail cases had only been brought in the United States (US), and 
none had progressed to a substantive hearing.60  This makes their continued relevance 
baffling, but as Hsu explains: 
 
[A c]ase – seeking direct civil liability against those responsible for greenhouse gas 
emissions – is the one that holds out the promise of being a magic bullet. By targeting 
deep-pocketed private entities that actually emit greenhouse gases ... a civil litigation 
strategy, if successful, skips over the potentially cumbersome, time-consuming, and 
politically perilous route of pursuing legislation and regulation.  [citation omitted] … 
Importantly, to maximize the impact of this kind of litigation, the relief sought should be 
for damages, not injunctive relief. Injunctive relief in a successful lawsuit would have the 
positive effect of mandating some action to reduce emissions, but then as a substantive 
matter the suit takes on the character of just another form of regulation, and a 
considerably less informed and sophisticated one. 61 
 
This encapsulates the thinking behind the early (and arguably current) holy grail 
litigation, and indeed, this argumentation is compelling.  Yet, it also raises questions 
about the nature of these cases, whether they can achieve their stated aims, what a 
‘sophisticated damages award’ might do, and whether a ‘magic bullet’ could indeed 
‘take out’ climate change.  Indeed, part of the appeal of these cases is the grandiose 
desire to ‘solve’ climate change in one case.  
 
In that context, it is worth taking a step back and asking some questions about what 
these cases really do, given the sustained energy and attention paid to them.  This is a 






valuable endeavour for at least two reasons.  Primarily, it is useful to ask some 
questions about what victory means, what the cases are intended to achieve, and 
whether these particular ‘quests for the holy grail’ are worth pursuing.  This resonates 
with the grail lessons concerning the uncertain nature of a ‘win’, which ties to the 
difficult question of how to evaluate the impacts of climate cases more generally. It also 
that asking the right questions, properly understanding what one is going after and why, 
are crucial to success in such complex endeavours.  There are some secondary questions 
which are more complex to resolve and on which I do not seek a definitive conclusion, 
as these are more points for reflection; these questions are, how these cases and the 
commentary around them are contributing to the narrative about climate change and, to 
some extent, what the opportunity cost is of pursuing these cases.   But before I discuss 
this I need to explain my theoretical approach and why I think it is helpful. 
 
2.3 Problems of Knowing and the Use of Metaphor and Theory  
The theoretical approach to this article is complex and layered.  As such, I think it is 
helpful immediately to explain these overlapping approaches, and how they support the 
arguments I want to make in this article.  The purpose of this article is to stimulate 
reflection on the aims, impact and meaning of climate litigation.   Of course, one, rather 
obvious way of doing this, would be to investigate the outcomes and impacts of the 
cases using empirical methods. Osofsky and Peel have done socio-legal research, in 
particular interviews assessing attitudes to and reflections on multilevel climate 
litigation in the two most significant jurisdictions for climate litigation, the US and 
Australia.62  This does tell us what interested participants in those jurisdictions perceive 
the effect of climate litigation to be, but it certainly does not tell us everything that these 





cases do, or what these cases mean. Also, empirical scholarship is not the only way to 
do this.  Setzer and Vanhala say that the ‘third wave’ of climate litigation scholarship is 
likely to examine the ‘outcomes of climate change litigation, including how it has both 
influenced climate regulation and acted as such regulation’, and is likely to do so 
through a variety of approaches nested in socio-legal studies, political science and 
social and political theory. 63 This includes a small body of work that looks at narrative 
and framing within climate cases,64 which can examine outcomes, but also contributes 
to our understanding of the meaning and significance of these cases as part of a broader 
legal mobilization against climate change.  I return to this point shortly.   
 
Another way to appraise the impacts of litigation is to interpret it in the light of legal 
theory.  The climate law literature tends to prefer a doctrinal focus, but there is a 
substantial scholarly project that examines and debates the instrumental properties of 
private law, providing a well-established and defensible theoretical account of the 
outcomes of tort cases. 65   As a starting point, the effects of private liability can include 
compensation for existing harm, deterrence of future harm, and the distribution of costs 
of accidents or other forms of wrongful behaviour.66   It is well-established that the 
process and outcomes of private liability weigh directly on litigants, but the litigation as 

















a whole has effects that extend beyond those immediately involved.67 This broader 
circle might include repeat litigants, but also those engaged in similar activities or with 
a similar risk profile.68  I should emphasize that the theory is fortified by empirical 
studies in other areas.  For instance, there is empirical evidence that corporations 
proactively manage liability risks, in narrow instances where it was anticipated liability 
could be proven.69   
 
If we accept that private liability can have broader societal implications, then these 
would materialize irrespective of whether they are actively pursued as a goal.  
Similarly, to say that private law plays an instrumental role is a simple 
acknowledgement of the very public role that the courts play in society; it does not 
necessarily entail a call for instrumental decision-making, or a flight from principle.70 
Judges frequently consider the broader implications of their decisions, particularly in 
environmental law cases, where the line between policy and law is particularly porous.  
This is not to say that the courts are doing anything wrong if they cannot take account 
of the ‘multipolar’ implications of any decision – clearly the task of a judge, is to do 
justice by the individual litigants within law’s limits.  Indeed, the true effects of 
litigation are hard to measure; and where this is attempted the ‘expected’ impacts are 
not overwhelmingly proven.71  Also clear is that an instrumental effect of private law 

















cannot be guaranteed to operate in a straightforward way; in particular in relation to 
complex social problems or multiparty litigation, it seems unrealistic to expect complex 
litigation about contested policy and scientific issues to yield simple regulatory 
messages.  In essence, we do not know, for sure, what these cases do; later I shall 
reflect on what this means for claimants’ and their representatives’ understanding of 
their objective and purpose before litigation commences. 
 
Fourthly: climate cases contribute to the public conversation about climate change.  
This function is sometimes expressed as ‘raising awareness’, or introducing climate 
issues into public debate and political culture.72 The translation of ‘abstract scientific 
concepts into tangible impacts’ helps the public to ‘understand and relate .. better’ and 
supports the development of meaning and public knowledge about climate change, 73 
with potential to engage ‘moral intuitions’ and encourage action.74  We can take this 
further to think about how these very high-profile, well-publicized pieces of litigation 
contribute to the social narrative about climate change.   
 
But what does this add to anything? ‘Law, as a domain of human enterprise, is 
fundamentally discursive in nature’.75  For this reason, examining the narratives, myths 
and metaphors we use in legal thinking, can support mutual understandings and make 
difficult concepts and experiences coherent and comprehensible.76  Narrative processes 
are complex and can flow in multiple directions, revealing multi-layered meanings,77 
persuading the reader in one direction or another.  Narratives are shaped and amplified 









by scholars who, in ‘tidying up’ the law,78 contribute to the framing and our 
understanding of climate cases.79  The discussion and reinterpretation of discrete 
disputes contributes to the stories we tell ourselves about climate change, develops the 
public understanding of issues of responsibility, danger and effective action.80 As such, 
commentators, including legal scholars, to some extent determine the character of a 
decision, refining its message and implications, and in so doing constructing our public 
story about climate change. This tells us what this decision does. 
 
It is not necessary, for this article, to look much further into critical perspectives on 
narratization.81  Importantly for my purposes, narrative and metaphor work together as 
devices that help us understand how things ‘hang together’;82 where the metaphorical 
process helps us to organize our perceptions, and narrative combines these perceptions 
in a coherent story.83  It is easy to accept that legal reasoning relies on narrative, yet it is 
surprising how pervasive metaphor is in legal language and culture. 84  Metaphors have 
a distinct, dense and sudden way of conveying meaning; they rely on mutual 
understanding or tacit knowledge of one subject to convey or force meaning to 
something else.85  The process by which this happens is not simple or uniform.86  Del 





















Mar explains that the process of engaging with a metaphor is intensively participatory, 
engaging one on multiple levels in the imaginative process of coming to see one thing 
as another thing.87  However, theorists have identified a tendency for most fields of 
study to use ‘conventional metaphors or stock narratives’;88 so in as much as these 
devices do open channels of thought, and persuade the reader to engage in the 
imaginative work of seeing one thing as another,89 where these become fixed they can 
also constrain thinking and leave out important perspectives.90  Responding to a fixed 
metaphor is a fairly staid process, as metaphorical similarities become, according to Del 
Mar, ‘congealed’.91 For instance, the ‘holy grail’ is a fixed metaphor – even though 
most people know that we do not know what the holy grail is, they instantly understand 
what is meant if we refer to something as the ‘holy grail’.   
 
Simultaneously, metaphor can be disruptive or distortative.  The use of novel metaphors 
can disrupt established thinking patterns, signalling the need for further thought, 
‘placing us on epistemic alert’.92  If metaphor contains the ‘distilled residue’ of a story, 
then metaphor can interact with narrative by disrupting the associations we have 
made,93 forcing us into ‘epistemic alert’ and causing us to question our assumptions.  
This is the process I hope to stimulate with this article.  By exploring the stories of the 
holy grail, I seek to challenge the easy assumptions about this metaphor, and to see 
whether the depth of these stories cannot force more thought about what grail quests 













are, and what they mean.  I combine this with more formal private law theory 
approaches to analyzing the effects of litigation in private law.  
 
I am, of course, aware of the limits of this analysis.  In as much as private law theory 
can provide food for thought as to the impacts, effects and meaning of certain kinds of 
legal cases, it cannot provide definitive answers as to what these cases do.  The same 
might be said for metaphorical analysis.  I appreciate as well that there are multiple 
reasons why this approach could be attacked – why so much theory? Why not use one, 
or the other? Why not discuss the cases more, and fairy stories less?   The answers in 
short are that I examined the grail legends, to make sense of why these cases are 
sometimes called ‘holy grail’ cases. I have used the theory that best supported the point 
I wanted to make in relation to both litigation outcomes and the narrative that surrounds 
these cases.  A further possible challenge could be: if you want to find out what these 
cases do, design an empirical study.  This is, of course a different endeavour to the one 
undertaken here, and certainly a necessary one. However, my analysis does things an 
empirical study cannot and does not aim to do, which is to raise questions about the 
implications but also the meaning of these cases, to raise normative questions, and to 
encourage reflection on the contribution of ‘holy grail’ cases to narrative about climate 
change.  It is to these cases that I turn now.  
 
3. THE FIRE SERMON: URGENDA AND MITIGATION ACTION 
 
The first decision in Urgenda Foundation v. The Netherlands 94 was a much-needed 
climate ‘win’ at a time when the prospects of any kind of effective climate action 
                                                
94	ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196.	(Urgenda	I)	
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seemed tenuous.  It was brought by non-governmental organization, Urgenda, and 
hundreds of citizens claimants seeking relief for violations of human rights and under 
Dutch tort law, on the basis that their government’s lack of climate ambition was 
harmful to them and future generations.  The claimants persuaded the Hague District 
Court that the Dutch government was liable for hazardous negligence on account of its 
inadequate climate policies, which at the time required a 17% reduction of GHG 
emissions by 2020, against a 1990 baseline, in accordance with European Union (EU) 
climate policy.95  The ‘tort’ aspect of the case was brought under the Dutch Civil Code 
and is based on an ‘open standard’ of negligence, in terms of which the court can make 
a determination as to what is reasonable and lawful behaviour for ‘due care exercised in 
society’.96  Articles 2 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 97 
were used reflexively, as an ‘interpretive tool’ to inform the court’s understanding of 
the duty of care, and (along with international law) ‘the framework for and the manner 
in which the State exercises its climate policy’. 98  The court gave an injunctive order 
against the government and thereby confirmed two standards: that global warming 
should be limited to 2°C and that the Dutch government should reduce its emissions by 
at least 25% by 2020.  The emissions reductions limit was the minimum level requested 
by the claimants. 
 
Unsurprisingly, this decision was appealed, and late in 2018 the Court of Appeal in the 
Hague upheld the decision, requiring the Dutch government to change domestic policy 













to achieve a 25% emissions reduction by 2020, compared to 1990 levels.99  The Court 
of Appeal’s reasoning, however, was very different, as while it upheld the tort decision 
of the court below,100 most of the Court’s judgment focused on the question whether the 
fundamental rights that had been used in terms of the ‘reflex effect’ in the court of first 
instance, 101 could in fact be applied directly under Dutch national law.102  The court 
found that Urgenda could invoke Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR directly, under Book 3 
Section 305a of the Dutch Civil Code and Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution. 
103 However, as Roy explains: ‘To clarify, this does not mean that the cause of action is 
violation of human rights. The cause of action is still a civil or private law claim that the 
State has not satisfied its duty of care …. [Urgenda] wanted the Appeals Court to 
reverse the opinion of the District Court that Articles 2 and 8 ECHR do not have 
binding value in determining the lawfulness of the State’s exercise of the duty of 
care…’104  What is most significant for the purposes of the article, is that the court 
upheld the injunctive order, requiring a 25% reduction in Dutch emissions as against a 
1990 baseline by 2020, with costs.  This was subsequently appealed, and a lengthy and 
detailed opinion of Advocate General Wissink and Procurator General Langemeijer 
urged the Supreme Court to uphold the Court of Appeal’s decision, on human rights 
grounds, alternatively in accordance with the open standard of negligence.105  The 
Supreme Court upheld the decision in December 2019.106 

















Urgenda was deliberate and strategic litigation, initiated and prepared by seasoned 
environmental campaigners and litigators,107 then brought in a judiciously chosen 
jurisdiction. It was the outcome of a long-term and carefully thought-through process of 
preparation. The action had the clearly stated purpose of compelling increased ambition 
on climate mitigation; specifically, the suit sought a commitment to an emissions 
reduction target that exceeded the reductions to which the Netherlands was already 
bound under EU law.108   
 
The case set a remarkable precedent and was hailed as an incredible victory for climate 
activists. It was the first large-scale climate action based in tort law which proceeded to 
a substantive hearing, the first where the claimant ‘succeeded’, and the first time a court 
had determined the appropriate emissions-reduction target for a developed state.109 It is 
said to have improved ambition on climate mitigation (although see below).  Urgenda 
inspired similar litigation, 110 as well as differently formulated cases seeking similar 
relief.111  It has also been claimed that this created a groundswell of enthusiasm, which 
contributed to the relative success of COP21 to the United Nations Framework 


















Convention on Climate Change.112  All this, of course, is speculative; yet I am reluctant 
to be overly critical of speculative or theoretical accounts of the ‘effect’ of Urgenda, as 
like the other cases discussed in this article, whether and how one might establish its 
full meaning and implications are uncertain.  It may well be that the decision simply 
fitted into the general direction of travel.  
 
The glamour of this case contributed to the expectation that litigation of this nature 
might ‘save the world’ - for a while, everybody wanted an Urgenda.113   It has certainly 
generated a wealth of interesting and incisive scholarship,114 most particularly 
concerning the relationship between the decision and international law;115 questioning 
its implications for EU climate law; 116 concerning the legitimacy of the decision and its 
implications for separation of powers;117 the formulation of the duty of care,118 and 
whether the campaign could be replicated in other jurisdictions.119  These are obvious 
topics of discussion, not least because of the fate of the previous generation of ‘holy 
grail’ cases, discussed in the next section. But in the quest for whether the decision 
might survive or be replicated in other jurisdictions, there needs to be space for 
questions as to whether it should.  
 




















The critical analysis of Urgenda has in the main failed to distinguish the moral triumph 
of this first tort success from whether the result was good.  This is the first linkage with 
the grail stories: there is not necessarily a connection between success and restoration, 
particularly when success is an undefined aspiration. Determining what ‘good’ might 
mean in this context can be difficult, but I would argue that at the very least, a 
successful climate action should give us a reasonable guarantee of confining warming 
to safe levels or we end up in a Galahad-type story, where we return triumphant with 
the grail, but nevertheless we all die.   Certainly, the decision is far from a victorious, 
restoring grail.  It did require the Dutch government to increase their climate ambition, 
but the order was only provisional while the appeals process ran out,120 and it would 
appear that little has been done in the interim to reduce emissions.121  A Climate Act is 
proposed, but this is silent on ambition to 2020, the period that is subject to dispute in 
Urgenda, and the to-mid-century reduction targets, while stringent, are non-binding.122  
 
So, how do we understand what this decision is and whom it serves?  The theory on the 
regulatory role of private law is complex and nuanced, potentially including a variety of 
standard-defining and compliance or enforcement functions.123  This can include 
behaviour-forcing effects, as a defendant would modify practices to avoid liability. 
Complexities arise when the duties or standards held up as (for example) reasonable in 
a tort claim challenge the prevailing position on an issue.124  This provides claimants 














with unique power to influence standard setting or challenge orthodox or conservative 
positions on matters of science (or policy disguised as science) 125 in the process of 
vindicating harms.126 It also lets claimants take the initiative when other forms of 
regulation lag behind.127 Private law therefore does not only deter behaviour but also 
defines what that behaviour should be; it also heralds tremendous potential for 
standards determined as ‘reasonable’ by judges, to inform and supplement lax 
regulation.128   
 
The Urgenda courts purported to make an order that would limit warming to 2°C. Of 
course, the Netherlands had already committed to a 2°C warming limit in the 
multilateral negotiations under the climate regime, at the COP in Cancun (Mexico).129 
Specifically, a decision paragraph describing the parties’ shared vision, recorded that 
the community:  
 
‘… recognises that deep cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are required according to 
science, and as documented in the Fourth Assessment Report of the [IPCC], with a view to 
reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature 
below 2 °C above pre- industrial levels, and that Parties should take urgent action to meet this 
long-term goal, consistent with science and on the basis of equity;  
also recognises the need to consider … strengthening the long-term global goal on the basis of the 
best available scientific knowledge, including in relation to a global average temperature rise of 
1.5 °C.’130  
 










Of course, this commitment did not create a directly enforceable legal obligation, but 
this does not mean it has no legal effect.131  As such, although COP decisions are non-
binding, the Netherlands could be seen as having recognized and endorsed a norm of 
below 2°C, in good faith, some years previously.132 As such, arguably by 2015 ‘…both 
the adequacy and the feasibility of the 2°C target [settled on by the court] was already 
contentious’.133  Only a few months later it was agreed in Paris (France) that ‘well 
below 2°C’ with efforts to limit to 1.5°C is required to avoid dangerous interference 
with the climate system.134 The fact that this strong temperature aspiration was possible 
in Paris is reflective of the fairly broad acceptance that 2°C of warming would be a 
veritable death sentence for many.135  The Appeal Court acknowledged the global 
scientific consensus that warming should not exceed 2°C, and that insights over the last 
few years acknowledged that safe warming could not exceed 1.5°C,136 as did the 
Supreme Court.137  Indeed, the day before the Urgenda appeal decision was handed 
down the special IPCC report confirmed the implications of warming exceeding 1.5°C 
(and the dramatic reductions in emissions required to reach this): not least, this includes 
huge distributive implications, given the severity of likely impacts on the world’s 
poor.138  
 





















Returning to the feasibility point:  one of the reasons the Paris Agreement includes a 
commitment to peaking emissions as soon as possible,139 is that delaying emissions 
reductions makes the steeper reductions required later on even more difficult.140  One 
would expect a major historical and present emitter such as the Netherlands to do more 
than the aggregate in terms of reductions, not less. This was acknowledged in the 
decision of the Court of Appeal, when they stated as follows:   
 
‘... An even distribution of reduction efforts over the period up to 2030 would mean that the State 
should achieve a substantially higher reduction in 2020 than 20%. An even distribution is also the 
starting point of the State for its reduction target of 49% by 2030, which has been derived in a 
linear fashion from the 95% target for 2050. If extrapolated to the present, this would result in a 
28% reduction by 2020….’141  
 
Relying on the 2007 IPCC report,142 the High Court chose the minimum level of 
mitigation pleaded, which as discussed in the decision, would mean it was ‘as likely as 
not’ to keep emissions within the temperature target.143 The Court of Appeal, while 
giving a very robust decision, made it very clear that it could not make an order for 
steeper emissions cuts to 2020, as the reduction limits had not been appealed.144  So 
even if the 2°C goal could keep warming within tolerable limits, it is arguable that a 
reduction of Dutch emissions by 25% (taken in the aggregate) is consistent with an 
equivalent risk of not meeting that, on the basis that it is ‘as likely as not’ that warming 














would be kept under 2°C with these percentage reductions.   Indeed, until about 2010, 
the Netherlands assumed a reduction target of 30% compared to 1990 levels, 145 which 
was reduced in line with the EU reduction target ‘without climatological 
substantiation’,146  and the claimant asked for an up to 40% reduction in its pre-action 
correspondence and original pleadings.  So why did the court order a 25% reduction, 
rather than, say, 28%, 30% or 40%?  The answer is that after establishing that a 25% 
reduction constitutes the absolute minimum, the court then considered that ordering a 
higher percentage would ‘clash with the discretionary power’ of the state. Given the 
politically charged subject matter, it noted that it should respect the government’s 
policy-making role, and exercise restraint; this in essence reflects long-standing 
concerns about the role and legitimacy of the courts within democratic governance.147  
  
This is essence is the separation of powers struggle that lies at the heart of Urgenda, 
and in some sense, all Holy Grail climate litigation, which is the capacity of and 
constraints on the courts to impose standards or make mandatory orders in areas that are 
considered the domain of politics. Through the appeals process the Urgenda courts have 
emphasised that the Dutch separation of powers is not absolute, because a judge’s 
democratic power and authority is derived from democratically enacted legislation.148    
This of course is magnified when the politics are quite so contentious, or when issues of 
fundamental rights are at stake. 149  While an indepth discussion of this issue probably 
exceeds the scope of this article,150 suffice to say here that judicial restraint was 











exercised because of concerns about legitimacy and proportionality, as well as 
difficulties in understanding what the consequences of the decision might be.  As the 
District Court itself acknowledged: ‘the consequences of the court’s intervention are 
difficult to assess’. 151  It was well aware that the decision would have far-reaching 
implications, which, due to the complex nature of the litigation, would be difficult to 
predict or control; it was also well aware that overreaching could give rise to grounds 
for challenge.  Yet it seems strange to suggest that this issue of principle could be 
resolved by exercising restraint in relation to the extent of the reductions ordered.  
Whether the District Court was correct to act as it did is surely a matter of law, and 
cannot be determined quantitively, and surely once the court has sought to increase the 
emissions reduction target at all, the constitutional questions would not differ whatever 
the percentage reduction was. 152  But in making this compromise the court changed the 
character of the endeavour to some extent; while the Urgenda decision was rather 
radical from a lawyers perspective, the court chose a conservative path in terms of what 
it required for climate mitigation.153 
  
If we think about what this means in terms of regulatory standards, we are left with a 
curious outcome. The Hague district court took a decisive step and made an order that 
another organ of state must improve its climate ambition. In so doing it purported to 
influence regulation in a direct way, and set two headline standards as to the extent of 
the action required, confirming the 2°C warming limit and that 25% by 2020 emissions 
reduction was required further to achieve this, despite the questions outlined above, as 
to whether these standards were consistent with an aggregate trajectory towards safe 







limits on warming.  Here we can make a further linkage with our grail lessons: finding 
and returning the grail, in and of itself, looks like a triumph, but it is only so in versions 
of the story so corrupted that the quest for the impossible becomes an end in itself.  The 
holy grail of Urgenda was not going to restore the wasteland, and proper enquiry 
should have shown that very clearly. 
 
There is a further aspect to this. It seems unfair to criticize Urgenda for not achieving 
enough.154 We all know how litigation goes – outcomes are unpredictable, risks are 
high, and this first tort victory surely was an achievement.  But it might be suggested 
that the academic (and activist) community have not served the public, or the planet, 
well in their important ‘tidying up’ role,155 in terms of the narrative this has created 
around the Urgenda decisions. This heroic framing risks contributing to a sense of 
complacency, an interpretation that the job is done, the grail is found, the quest was 
successful. But any ‘job done’ attitude to this decision would crowd out the potential 
for conversations about the inadequacy of the reductions prescribed by the court, and 
indeed, the lack of effect this seems to have had on Dutch climate policy.  It is perfectly 
possible to applaud the valour of Urgenda while cautioning that its result is not 
necessarily consistent with safe limits on warming. Despite the scale of the 
achievement, this decision was not radical or disruptive, but a deeply ‘conservative’,156 
business-as-usual outcome, which is as consistent with overshooting the temperature 
target as otherwise, even if the Dutch government had complied with the order.  
 
4.  DEATH BY WATER: LITIGATION FOR CLIMATE HARMS 
 





Forg[e]t the cry of gulls, and the deep sea swell 
And the profit and loss… 157 
 
The relative conservatism of the Urgenda litigation can be contrasted with the 
radicalism of the first generation of holy grail cases.158 These earlier cases sought 
damages against the ‘polluter’ class of defendants, and were brought with the sense that 
they could be the ‘magic bullet’.159   These cases have a very different character to 
Urgenda, in more than just their choice of defendant and relief sought, and focus on an 
event rather than climate policy more generally.  While they might have had a 
secondary effect of forcing improved mitigation, the true quest of these cases was to 
recover the costs of climate harms from those perceived to have caused them.160 These 
early cases, had they succeeded, would have been true game-changers. This section will 
focus on the litigation arising from Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  I shall outline it very 
briefly to begin.   
 
4.1.  Comer v. Murphy – Loss and Damage 
 
Comer v. Murphy 161 was brought on behalf of a group of plaintiffs who had suffered 
loss and damage as a consequence of Hurricane Katrina in the US in 2005. The action 

















was brought in private law (including actions for unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy 
and aiding and abetting, public and private nuisance, trespass, negligence, and 
fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment) against two broad categories of 
defendants. One was a group of major emitters, from whom compensation was sought 
for the contribution their emissions had made to what can be called a climate disaster, 
Hurricane Katrina.162 This group included various oil companies, as well as coal and 
chemical companies, joined as co-defendants in a series of preliminary hearings. The 
second group, financial institutions, included insurance companies that had failed to 
compensate the claimants for damage caused in the hurricane, as well as mortgage 
companies, on the basis that they had provided insufficient insurance to protect their 
own mortgaged property.   
 
The procedural history of the Comer litigation is complex.163 The original proceedings 
gradually suffered dismissal in a recusal fiasco,164 which could be seen to reflect judicial 
refusal to engage at any cost. The reissued action - in public and private nuisance, 
negligence and trespass - was ultimately dismissed.  A number of formal reasons were 
offered for dismissal.165 The plaintiffs lacked standing, as they were unable to establish 
a causal connection between the defendants’ emissions and the harm.166 The action 



















raised political questions.167 I shall refer to these loosely as ‘justiciability’ issues. These 
preliminary issues certainly were not unanticipated.168  And of course, had any of the 
first-generation doctrinal cases been put to a substantive hearing, some knotty doctrinal 
problems would have been under discussion.169 
 
The hallmark of this first generation of holy grail cases – in which they crucially differ 
from cases like Urgenda - was the choice to seek compensation from contributors to 
and financial beneficiaries of our societal binge on fossil fuels, the most obvious targets 
for climate litigation.170 Of course, a positive result could have set a powerful deterrent, 
and supported emissions abatement, given that the defendants were all large-scale 
emitters.  But the character of these cases is different – their possible effect on broader 
climate policy may have been implicit, but the primary purpose of these cases was to 
seek redress for climate harms. This seems like an entirely obvious statement, but this 
was entirely radical. 
 
Compensation is a core function of private law.171 But what is ‘distinctive’ about private 
law actions, is not just that the claimant stands to be compensated, but that she stands to 
be compensated by the defendant.172 Tort can be called a ‘responsibility-based 
mechanism’, because making the defendant assume the costs of the claimant’s harm, (at 
least notionally) makes the defendant take responsibility for its conduct. 173  These first 
generation cases have their legal and moral basis in the defendants’ socially-conflicted 











role as a significant emitter of GHG emissions in the past, present and (probably, the 
way things are going) future. In so doing, cases like Comer pre-empt what is, even now, 
a no-go zone in a contentious area, namely compensation for climate loss and damage.  
I will return to this point later, when I discuss the carbon majors cases.  There is more to 
say about the implications of Comer.  
 
The compensatory functions of private law are inherently associated with this 
distributive or ‘risk control’ function.174   By holding the defendant responsible a 
successful climate tort would shift the cost of harm onto the party who allegedly caused 
it. Conversely, where seeking recompense through private law is unsuccessful, the costs 
of climate harms (or of taking preventative measures through adaptation) will fall to the 
claimant. This compensation/distribution function also operates between different 
potential defendants.175 In this way liability or the prospect thereof either explicitly or 
implicitly allocates the costs of activities or risks of new technologies between involved 
participants. This can also operate in a negative way, for instances where the prospects 
of success are poor for doctrinal reasons, or because access to justice concerns prevent 
meaningful engagement by some parties, the claimant will be left to bear the burden of 
his own loss.  Under such circumstances the costs and risks occasioned by the 
defendants’ conduct remain where they naturally fall.   
 
In Comer, the court declined the opportunity to reallocate the cost of the defendants 
high-emitting activities to them, leaving the most impecunious claimants without a 









meaningful day in court, and to bear their own loss, without recompense.176  The refusal 
to adjudicate these matters raises all sorts of questions about the instrumental effects of 
adverse decisions, including dismissals, in climate cases. The rejection of these and 
similar cases on (broadly speaking) grounds of justiciability, was an explicit judicial 
refusal to deal with climate change. However, interestingly, given the historic row 
about climate science, there is no suggestion that a denial of the problem underlies the 
decisions made.177 In each of the first-generation cases, the respective court’s reluctance 
stemmed from the perceived inappropriateness of it making determinations both 
concerning redress for climate harms and future regulation of emissions.178  The effect 
of the refusal decisions was implicitly to condone the defendants’ activities and dodge 
the need for scrutiny of the defendants’ past and ongoing activities.  So, while moving 
the focus of large-scale climate litigation to governments does make sense from some 
perspectives, and of course while ultimately governments do, or should, regulate private 
behaviour, the truncation of private law cases against large-scale enterprises cut off a 
mechanism to hold them to account in terms of their historical (and ongoing) conduct 
and behaviour.179  
 
Comer and its generational contemporaries reinforce orthodox ideas about legitimacy 
and the correct constitutional ‘place’ for climate governance, specifically, with elected 
government.  But these decisions were made hot on the heels of the abandonment by the 












US of the Kyoto Protocol,180 just at a time when the effects of climate change were 
becoming obvious, as evidenced by the substance of the litigation.  But litigation should 
afford a clear site of pressure against this kind of institutional failure,181 and these cases 
represented the refusal of yet another government body to take responsibility for this 
issue. Of course, it is small wonder the US federal courts did not want to enter this 
fraught and politicized domain, although by refusing to hear these cases, they did.   The 
dismissed actions did nothing to reverse the significant distributive consequences of 
Katrina, in which the cost of climate harms was borne by with the vulnerable claimants.  
Considering our grail lessons, while it is difficult to assess the harm that this judicial 
disengagement might have caused, arguably failed quests could only add to the appeal 
of trying again, with better questions and more refined strategies.182  But from a 
narrative perspective, Comer (and decisions like it) could be read as reinforcing a sense 
of complacency about climate change.   
 
The latest wave of private law climate cases seeks to hold so-called ‘carbon majors’ to 
account for their disproportionate contribution to the changing climate.  The 
identification of this group rests on a study by Heede, which traced and attributed 63% 
of global carbon and methane emissions between industrial times and 2010, and about 
half of global emissions since 1988, to a group of 90 ‘carbon majors’,183 also 
determining the proportion of their ‘contribution’.184 The climate modelling is supported 
by philosophical interpretation of the implications of the models of relative 











contribution, the relevant companies’ knowledge of the risks of fossil fuel use, and 
active steps taken to hide and obfuscate that knowledge.185  This research goes a long 
way towards connecting those defendants to climate harms, but is not enough, alone, to 
meet the legal criteria for causation of climate harms.  In addition, increasingly 
sophisticated event attribution studies seek directly to address some of the doctrinal 
problems that have been anticipated, specifically issues of foreseeability and 
causation.186  It is not my project to predict the prospects of these actions,187 and it 
remains to be seen whether this is enough to overcome all the doctrinal mismatches 
these cases face, and whether the right questions were asked when these studies were 
commissioned. The ‘carbon majors’ work has already given rise to human rights 
complaints,188 and various sets of proceedings have been issued, most of which are 
brought by US states or cities, in US state courts, seeking to avoid the displacement 
issues that plagued earlier generations of cases.189  A quite distinct set of proceedings, 
Lliuya v. RWE, have been brought by a Peruvian farmer, with the support of a German 
NGO, against a German power company, in the German courts. Proceedings are 
brought under §1004 of the German Civil Code, an action based on interference with 
ownership.190   
 



















Notably the character of the carbon majors tort cases is quite different from the first 
wave of loss and damage cases. So far, US ‘carbon majors’ tort cases are brought on 
behalf of public bodies (usually county or city governments) in anticipation of the costs 
to them of dealing with climate impacts, frequently sea-level rise.  The relief sought 
includes compensation for damage and abatement funds.  These are legitimately 
considered adaptation cases, as state bodies seek to claw back the costs of keeping their 
cities or states habitable.  There are various sets of proceedings, 191 and most are brought 
on the basis that the defendants’ production and promotion of fossil fuels constitutes a 
public nuisance.  Some include additional heads of claim for trespass or in private 
nuisance.192 The actions are either stayed or at a contentious early stage as the parties 
seek to deal with preliminary procedural issues – most significantly, the determination 
of the appropriate forum. 193 At the time of writing, the defendants have succeeded in 
early motions to dismiss in relation to two sets of proceedings: City of Oakland v. BP 194 
and City of New York v. BP.195  The dismissal hearings struck a depressingly familiar 
tone: the field was occupied by statute as a matter of precedent at a federal level,196 and 
the broad scope of the proceedings warranted a political solution.197  It remains to be 
seen what happens on appeal. 
 





















Lliuya presents a slightly different set of arguments.  The claimant seeks a contribution 
to the cost of dealing with the risk of glacial melt and associated catastrophes, 
proportional to RWE’s contribution as determined by the carbon majors study, 
calculated at 0.47% of total costs, or US$21,000.198  There are many reasons why a 
Peruvian action would be brought in the German courts,199 and avoiding ‘political 
question’ arguments might well be one of them.200  Despite a rocky ride through the 
lower courts, the claimant succeeded in the preliminary stages and the case will now 
proceed to the evidentiary stage.201 
 
Applying our grail lessons, we are invited to think about the true character of these 
cases, the questions that need to be asked, what victory and defeat might mean in this 
context, as well as the possible costs of this kind of litigation.  As before, these cases 
carry an air of moral conviction in a dire political context, and quite significantly, a 
context where both international and domestic efforts on climate change are being 
dismantled.  Like the knights’ progressive learning in the grail stories, they also reflect 
the climate litigation movement’s years of progressive learning of what works and does 
not work.202  They are brought in a setting where the discursive and scientific context is, 
perhaps, more receptive;203 and their presentation reflects the learning from past 
quests.204  The claimants and their lawyers have asked many of the right questions, and 
maybe we are getting closer to having successful private law climate cases. 















While their essential character seeks protection against future loss, these cases could, if 
successful, have significant implications when it comes to climate change mitigation.  
Litigation has been demonstrated to alter corporate behaviour, in other contexts.  I am 
not suggesting that these are the ‘magic bullet’ referred to by Hsu, but it is difficult to 
argue with the proposition that if even one of these cases succeeds, it would 
permanently and inevitably alter the financial risk profile of the identified ‘carbon 
majors’. 205 Yet, with the possible exception of Lluiya, it is more likely that they will 
fail, which is a risk that seems to be taken too lightly.  Arguably, each failure is just 
paving the way for what will, eventually, be a successful climate tort case.  This might 
happen, perhaps with a narrower focus.206 Moreover, the normative impact of a failed 
case can still be strong; it can still raise awareness of the problem, harm the defendants’ 
reputation and might still be enough to change polluters’ calculation of risk.207 
‘Signalling’ from the bench that supports the claimant’s purpose, can also yield a 
contribution in what would otherwise be a failed case. 208  All these reflections point to 
the question of narrative – the kind of story that is constructed around these cases both 
during and subsequent to the litigation.  Of course, the impact of these cases might play 
out quite differently.  If they fail, the ‘awareness’ being raised could be the implicit 
suggestion that the claimants were not deserving of relief, and that fossil fuel use is an 
inevitable social choice, and that the claimants are complicit.  The ‘judicial signalling’ 
so far in the US carbon majors cases, has done precisely this: applauding the social 









benefits of fossil fuels,209 or implicating the claimants in their use.210  As such, failed 
holy grail cases could either foster a sense of complacency or even justification, or 
contribute to a public perception that the courts are not going to help with climate 
action, and that therefore other forms of legal and civil society mobilization need to be 
intensified and refocused.211  
 
While contributing to mitigation might be an incidental effect of a successful holy grail 
case, in climate terms these cases are about adaptation, or climate loss and damage; in 
grail terms they concern the literal restoration of the wasteland.   The relief requested is 
the compensation for harm but also funds for resilience or prevention of future harm.  A 
successful action would send a strong message that climate loss and damage must be 
compensated, and directly by those who can be shown to have contributed to and 
profited from the problem.  The earlier discussion of Comer explored the implications 
of a defeat, and the impunity this creates for emitters.   The question remains, what does 
victory look like in these cases?  On one hand, victory could mean that the claimant is 
in funds to repair, for instance, flood damage, and take other progressive steps towards 
managing, say, sea-level rise, protecting local residents and their livelihoods and 
property interests. Yet, in Lluyia, which seems most likely to progress at the moment, 
even if the claimant was successful and recovered full damages, he would not be in 
funds to do so, recouping less than half a percent of his calculated loss.  If he sought an 
injunction, which is permissible under §1004 ‘if further interferences are to be feared’, 
this could have a spectacular impact on RWE and the fossil fuel industry,212 but it would 
not help with the costly work required to reduce risks from glacial melt.   Of course, 







there would still be value in victory, both in terms of what the decision might establish 
for the future replicability of the action,213 and the moral and political significance of the 
action, not least its recognition for the lay claimant.214  
 
Yet, a win or loss could be more complicated than that. As in any litigation, a victory 
serves (or should serve) the claimant, but as with any strategic litigation, it also aims to 
serve a wider community.  To an extent the salient question is not whether most private 
actions for loss and damage are possible, but whether they are desirable.  Tort claims of 
this nature raise quite significant questions about distributive justice, which sits 
uncomfortably with the still-controversial status and unsettled meaning of climate loss 
and damage in the global conversation.215   If these cases become part of the global 
climate narrative, what message do they convey about who is deserving of 
compensation and restoration from fossil fuel companies and other major emitters?  
 
Understanding this requires some reflection on what loss and damage means in climate 
governance.   This is not the place for a detailed exposition of the history and meaning 
of this contested term, but suffice to say, loss and damage arising from climate change 
is recognised as a priority in the climate change regime.216 However, the conception and 
meaning of loss and damage, 217 possible routes to funding, 218 and the relationship 
















between loss and damage and liability, 219 are contested and precarious.  This overlaps 
with the climate justice debate, where is it argued that the socially vulnerable need to be 
prioritised when it comes to rectification, 220 with the priorities based on need, 
redistribution and rehabilitation rather than necessarily based on compensation for 
wrongful conduct. 221  
 
One also needs to ask serious questions about the purpose and effect of litigating for 
climate loss and damage in this way.  Who is it intended to benefit?  Will this have 
implications for loss and damage in the multilateral negotiations, and if so, who will be 
harmed?  The slowness of the multiparty process, and express reluctance from 
negotiation participants from developed countries,222 significant gaps between rhetoric 
and action in vital areas,223 might mean that tort litigation ends up being the only route 
to redistribution.224 It might come to this at some point, but to do this now could be to 
ride roughshod into fractious and delicate ongoing conversations, potentially causing 
diplomatic upset and jeopardising fragile yet important gains.225  Litigation may not be a 
substitute for a multi-party process that addresses compensation and other aspects of 
climate loss and damage, particularly not if it might jeopardise that process.   























Additionally, if the defendants’ financial resources are finite, who will get there first? 
And last?   In my view, the enormity of the quest involved in bringing one of these 
actions seems to inherently exclude the possibility that the most vulnerable could 
benefit from such actions.  Certainly most of the claimants in the pending litigation are 
public entities from affluent states in the developed world.  This is not to suggest they 
do not have legitimate grievances, but perhaps they should not be first in the queue 
when it comes to recovering for loss and adaptation costs from fossil fuel companies.  
 
I am very conscious that above considerations, might be co-opted by others with 
adverse motives.  As such, any suggestion that the pursuit of holy grail litigation might 
not be entirely worthwhile, needs to be advanced with some delicacy. Yet the 
unpredictability of process and outcomes, as well as the impacts thereof, can make the 
implications of these cases difficult to know. They may achieve much, or they may 
achieve less than they purport to. It is only by asking the right questions that we can 
know which it is.  
 
6. WHAT THE THUNDER SAID: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
I have used the ancient stories of the quest for the holy grail to illustrate my thoughts 
and anxieties about some well-known climate cases. The grail legends are well-known 
and deeply engrained in the our consciousness, where they are usually associated with 
the trope of the wandering knight, the lone hero, of endeavours and victories.226 The 
knights’ quests have an all-or-nothing, high-risk, high-return quality to them; this is 




probably why ‘the holy grail’ is often used as a signifier of a zenith of achievement, 
something difficult to achieve, but that can fix everything.   
 
Actually reading these stories reveals complex tales of victory and defeat, of risk and 
reward, of the dangers of proceeding without a proper understanding of the complex 
character of the task ahead. The stories show that proceeding without asking these 
questions can have dire consequences – for the knight and (often) everyone around him.  
From these stories I have distilled four core lessons that provide critical insights into the 
complexities of large-scale climate litigation. Earlier I explained that some of the 
lessons we can learn from the stories are: (1) the nuance and complexity in notions of 
victory and defeat; (2) the importance of asking the right questions and ascertaining the 
character of one’s own quest, before proceeding and (3), that the significance of the 
costs of a failed quest.  But beyond these distilled lessons, I have suggested that fitting 
these cases and the narrative around them within these stories can provide ongoing food 
for thought and reflection.     
 
In that context, I have considered a very small selection of holy grail cases, asking what 
their aims, goals and character is. In so doing, I have made use of instrumental theories 
of private law to ask some questions about what these cases mean, whether they have 
been framed in a helpful way, and what the implications of telling the ‘wrong’ story 
about them, might be.  In particular, I look at what victory means or might mean in 
these cases.  
 
Looking forward, as much as climate change is the responsibility of governments – and 
it certainly is – there seems to be an appetite for moral and financial adjustment from 
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those who have benefited while causing harm to others.227 This, of course, includes the 
consumption and production of fossil fuels, but also, knowledge of the implications of 
these activities, combined with concerted obfuscation.228  The question is how to do 
this.    This is the difficult territory into which a court or claimant would venture in 
seeking to resolve these actions.  A failure to reach some kind of substantive conclusion 
perpetuates polluter impunity for climate harms, and fails to provide relief for some of 
those suffering the impacts of climate harms (although arguably, not those the most in 
need). Yet, a decision in favour of the claimants might cut across a delicate 
intergovernmental process, which notwithstanding its glacial pace, could be 
fundamental for maintaining the moral consensus – and all-important action - on 
climate. Of course, one favourable carbon majors decision could accelerate progress on 
that front, as well. Too many could change the financial profiles of the defendant major 
emitters, and in so doing undermine the prospects of substantial loss and damage 
financing (perhaps by fossil fuel companies) assuming this is achievable under any 
other circumstances.  
 
All these cases will have broad implications that extend beyond the discrete litigation. 
As highlighted earlier, the difficulty is that their complexity make these impacts 
difficult to predict, and it is difficult to know what questions to ask, without knowing 
which version of the story we are working in, and what the costs are of getting this 
wrong. The question then is whether it is safe to proceed without knowing that, or if the 
claimants are flogging a dead horse, and their considerable efforts would be best 
focused elsewhere. 
                                                
227	M.	Grasso	&	K.	Vladimirova,	‘A	Moral	Analysis	of	Carbon	Majors’	Role	in	Climate	Change’	(2020)	
Environmental	Values	(forthcoming),	conceptualise	this	as	a	non-homogenous	duty	of	reparation.	
228	Ibid.	
